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Abstract Standard economic analysis assumes the sets of public and private
goods to be exogenously given. Yet societies very often choose the public-private
mix, using resources to convert seemingly private goods into ones with public goods
characteristics and vice versa. And, in practice, we see a bewilderingly large variety of
public-private mixes across societies. This papers advances an analysis of the choice
of the public-private mix in the framework of voluntary contributions to public goods
provision, by envisaging that, starting from a situation where all goods have private
characteristics, some goods can be changed to have public goods characteristics at
a cost (by purchasing a “Samuelson machine”). It characterizes the jointly optimal
choice of the public-private mix and the eﬃcient supply or not of the public goods
in the mix. This characterization generates a number of testable predictions on the
public-private mix, and on the prevalence of free riding.
Keywords: Public goods; public-private mix; Samuelson machine; cost of
publicness.
JEL Classification: D11; D61; H41.
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1 Introduction
In standard public economics, the division between private goods and public goods is
taken as given and immutable. It is assumed that some goods simply have the tech-
nological feature that their consumption is non-rival and non-excludable. Following
Samuelson’s (1954) classic exposition, the set of (pure) public goods and the set of
private goods are part of the exogenous specification of the model. The analysis then
proceeds from this division to ask questions about such matters as eﬃcient supply,
decentralization, and free rider problems. Yet in the real world such a neat exogenous
division is not observed. Whether the consumption of a good is in fact non-rival and
non-excludable is often a social or historical construct rather than given by technol-
ogy. For example, defence expenditure is often cited as a typical example of a public
good: to defend a county, or to deter an attack on it, is to protect all the inhabitants
of the country. But national defence is a public good because of the artefact of the
nation state, one of whose basic functions is to maintain the integrity of its territory.
Before the re-unification of Germany in 1991 an attack on West Germany was not an
attack on East Germany. Now it is, and the inhabitants of the former East Germany
benefit from defence expenditure by the inhabitants of what was West Germany, and
vice versa.
Thus a population occupying a given territory, for example the area between the
Rhine and Oder rivers, can in principle be one in which defence eﬀort benefits only
those individuals or communities who incur the cost, rather than the entire popula-
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tion. Who benefits from whose defence expenditure , i.e. the degree of ’publicness’
of defence, depends on the political constitution of the territory. If it comprises a
collection of city states and principalities (which is how one might characterise both
Germany and Italy before their respective unifications in the nineteenth century)
then a large army in, say, Schleswig-Holstein or Lombardy will not deter aggression
against Bavaria or Tuscany. But in a united Germany or Italy, such aggression would
be deterred. Similarly, at the international level, signing defence treaties or setting
up organisations such as NATO whose central principal is that ’an attack on one is an
attack on all’ further extends the benefits of defence expenditure. This is embodied
in the notion of ’collective security’.
The evolution of defence arrangements at the local, national, and international
level is presumably partly a matter of choice for the individuals and countries con-
cerned. When they make this choice they convert a previously private good to one
which now has public goods properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Con-
versely, when societies collapse into anarchy and civil war, as has been happening in
many countries in Africa, or when they are partitioned, as with Germany in 1945 or
India in 1947, the process goes in the reverse direction.
A second example concerns the dissemination of information and signals. For
instance, television programmes, once produced, are in principle available to everyone:
there is no need to produce another programme or to hire additional actors or TV
presenters if more people are to view the programme. But in order for viewers not to
be excluded from seeing the programme they must be able to receive the TV signal.
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This requires some form of network: either a transmitter able to produce a strong
signal, or a network of transmitters that can relay a signal across long distances, or
a cable network connecting the viewer to the TV company, or a satellite to relay the
signal. The network acts a platform, without which the TV programme is a private
good, rather like a private theatre performance. With the network in place, the
marginal cost of including further viewers is essentially minimal. Thus the network
has the potential to transform a private good into a public good. Of course, some
forms of network do allow viewers to be excluded via devices such as satellite decoders;
the cable company can cut oﬀ your signal if you do not pay. But ’free-to-air’ signals
via conventional terrestial TV transmitters do not allow this. What we observe in
practice, then, is that every society that has access to a dissemination technology has
the opportunity to build a platform and to make TV signals a non-rivalrous and non-
excludable public good. Some societies choose to avail themselves of this opportunity;
others do not. Whether the good is private or public, then, is not exogenously given
but socially determined.
More generally, the “public-private mix” varies considerably across societies. By
this we mean not only the straightforward point that the share of public expendi-
ture in GDP varies across societies. Rather, the more telling observation is that the
composition of goods that are supplied through collective action varies greatly across
societies, even correcting for the share of the government in national income. For
example, higher education is in the collective domain to varying degrees across coun-
tries. In some countries, the national infrastructure for higher education is accessible
4
to all, with very little private supply, whereas in other countries there is very little in
the way of collective supply of this level of education. At a more local level, provision
of services such as garbage collection or security also demonstrates a broad spectrum
between collective and private provision. In some areas the good (service) of garbage
disposal is individualized, while in other areas it is a collective enterprise to which
the whole community contributes. In poor village economies, there is equally a wide
variation in the degree to which irrigation is individualized or collectivized. Even
when a good is supplied through collective action rather than privately, the free rider
problem is solved to diﬀerent degrees in diﬀerent situations (Ostrom, 1990), leading
to yet more variations in observed patterns for the supply of the same good.
The general point we wish to make is that while there may be some cases where
technology is destiny, in a large number of cases societies can indeed choose whether
a good is “private” (i.e. rivalrous and excludable in consumption) or “public” (i.e.
non-rivalrous and non-excludable). We wish to develop framework in which we can
think systematically about such choices and to delineate the costs and benefits of one
form of social organization over another. This will also allows to begin to identify the
factors that determine the public-private mix in the sense intended here, and thus to
explain the variations we observe in practice.
To fix ideas, consider the standard model of voluntary contributions to public
goods, as systematized for example by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). In
this model the private good has the property that an individual’s expenditure on
the good only benefits that individual. However, for public goods each individual’s
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expenditure benefits all individuals. In the most commonly used formulation, each
individual benefits from the sum of all individuals’ contributions. For example, if
there are two individuals and each contributes ten dollars, then each will in turn
enjoy twenty dollars worth of the public good. In other words, a machine for turning
ten dollar bills into twenty dollar bills! Such “Samuelson machines” clearly convey a
benefit relative to the alternative of autarchy. If goods could be costlessly converted
from private to public, then in this case of positive externalities a society would want
to have all its good public. Notice that this would be the case whether or not there was
free riding in the supply of the public good. It is better to eliminate free riding than
not, if it can be done costlessly, but society would be better oﬀ in either case. What is
important is that the conversion provides a platform for positive externalities, which
are beneficial relative to autarchy whether or not they are ultimately internalized
through further collective action.
In other words, in the context of the voluntary contributions to public goods model
we envisage three scenarios for a typical good. One scenario is simply that the good
in question is private. The second scenario is that the good is public but that the
contributions are determined as the equilibrium of a Nash contributions game. The
third scenario is that the good is public but the contributions are determined so as to
maximize joint welfare–the eﬃcient outcome. The value of converting from private to
public thus depends on what sort of collective action takes place after the conversion.
But in each case there is a prior collective act. This is the act of converting the good
from private to public–eﬀectively, putting in place a Samuelson machine where none
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existed before.
Suppose now that the institutional arrangements that need to be put into place to
generate positive externalities where there were none before are costly–treaties need
to be agreed on and signed for defence, joint arrangements for garbage disposal need
to be put into place, a common curriculum needs to be developed for schools, etc.
In other words, Samuelson machines are costly. How much would society be willing
to pay to get one if it didn’t already have one? If it already had m such machines,
how much would it be willing to pay for an additional (m+1)th machine? Of course
the answer depends on whether or not society will be able to enforce an eﬃcient
outcome once the machine is bought. But suppose now that achieving eﬃciency
is itself costly. The institutional arrangements for monitoring and sanctioning free
riding do not come free. However, the value of curbing free riding will itself not be
independent of the number of Samuelson machines in play. Our society then faces two
simultaneous interdependent problems–whether or not to curb free riding, and how
many Samuelson machines to buy. It is this joint solution that the paper develops
and interprets in the sections to come.
Section 2 presents the basic model–we develop the simplest possible setting in
which our basic points can be made cleanly and tractably. Section 3 considers the
value of Samuelson machines with and without free riding, and the optimal public-
private mix in each setting. Section 4 analyses the joint decision on public-private
mix and whether or not to control free riding. Section 5 concludes the paper with a
discussion and interpretation of the key results.
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2 Samuelson Machines
We will keep the basic model very simple to aid in sharpness for results and intuition.
Essentially, it is the log-linear version of the standard model of private contributions
to public goods (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986).
There are n goods in all, indexed j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In general, let m of these goods
be public and n−m goods be private. A public good has the standard properties of
non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. Denote the set of public goods by
P .
There are two individuals, each with identical lump sum income y. All prices are
normalized at unity. Individual i spends xij on good j, so the budget constraint is
given by P
j
xij = y ; i = 1, 2 (1)
Let the consumption of good j by individual i be denoted cij. Then
cij = xij for j /∈ P (2)
cij = c∼ij = cj = xij + x˜ij for j ∈ P (3)
where∼ i denotes the individual other than i. Thus, for a public good, each individual
enjoys consumption of the sum of all expenditures on the good.
Utility of individual i from consumption is given by
Ui =
P
j
αj log cij ; αj > 0 ∀j ;
P
j
αj = 1, (4)
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where log denotes the natural logarithm. In other words, we assume that preferences
are log linear with parameters αj. Using (2) and (3), the utility function in (4) and
the budget constraint in (1) can be rewritten as
Ui =
P
j /∈P
αj log cij +
P
j∈P
αj log cj ; i = 1, 2 (5)
P
j /∈P
cij +
P
j∈P
cj = y +
P
j∈P
x˜ij ; i = 1, 2 (6)
Thus, for each individual it is as though there were an increase in lump sum income
equal to the contributions of the other individual to public goods.
We start by considering the Nash equilibrium in contributions to the public good.
Each individual maximizes (5) subject to (6) i.e. taking as given the other’s expen-
diture on public goods. Using (2) and (3) the first order conditions can be written
as
xij = αj
·
y +
P
k∈P
x˜ik
¸
; j /∈ P (7)
xij + x˜ij = αj
·
y +
P
k∈P
x˜ik
¸
; j ∈ P (8)
The solution can be approached using the fact that in this society of identical indi-
viduals, equilibrium will be symmetric, so that xij = x˜ij= xj. Equation (8) can then
be rewritten as
2xNj = αj
·
y +
P
k∈P
xNk
¸
y ; j ∈ P (9)
where the superscript N denotes the Nash equilibrium outcome. The equations in
(9) have as solution:
xNj =
·
αj
2− β
¸
y ; j ∈ P (10)
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where β =
P
k∈P αk. Using this in (3), equation (7) gives the consumption levels of
all goods for the (identical) individuals:
cNj =αj
·
2
2− β
¸
y for all j (11)
Substituting back into the utility function gives us Nash equilibrium utility for each
individual as follows:
V N = K + log y + log
2
(2− β) (12)
where
K =
nP
j=1
αj log αj (13)
V 0 = K+ log y can be thought of as an individual’s autarchy utility, the level that
can be achieved if he/she is unable to take advantage of the other’s provision of public
goods.
As is well known, the Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient. The eﬃcient allocation is
derived as the solution to
max
nP
j=1
αjlogc1j +
nP
j=1
αjlogc2j
s.t.
P
j /∈P
(c1j + c2j) +
P
j∈P
cj = 2y (14)
The common consumption levels and utility are thus given by
cEj = αjy ; j /∈ P (15)
cEj = 2αjy ; j ∈ P (16)
10
and
V E = K + log y + β log 2 (17)
where the superscript E denotes the socially eﬃcient outcome.
It can be seen directly from (10) and (13) that utility in both N and E depends on
the set of goods that are public. In particular, given the parameters α1, ...,αn, both
V N and V E increase with β =
P
j∈P αj. This is shown in Figure 1, where V
0 = K+
log y (which does not depend on β ) is set equal to 0. As expected, when β = 0 (i.e.
when all goods are private), there can be no free riding in the Nash Equilibrium and
V N = V E = V 0. The possibility of free riding arises when β > 0, and indeed for
0 < β < 1, V 0 < V N < V E. But surprisingly, V N = V E when β = 1. At first, this
seems very counter-intuitive, as one might expect that the more public goods there
are, the greater the welfare loss from free riding in the Nash Equilibrium. But free
riding operates when agents under-supply public goods and consume more private
goods; in other words, free riding needs a public good/private good margin at which
to operate. If β = 1 this margin does not exist; and even if β is close to 1, then
private goods carry little weight in agents’ utility functions, so the incentive to free
ride is very low. The eﬃciency loss V E − V N thus depends both on the opportunity
for free riding, which requires a high level of β, and the incentive to free ride, which
requires a low level of β. For extreme values of β, one of the requirements is absent.
In our model, it is easily checked that V E−V N is greatest when β = 2− 1
log 2
= 0.557.
When consumers have identical preferences, the result that the eﬃciency loss is zero
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if there are only public goods is quite general, since all consumers will choose their
private supply of public goods to maximise the same utility function u(c1, c2, ...cn),
where j ∈ P for j = 1, ...n. With identical tastes and no private goods, all agents’
private incentives are perfectly aligned towards maximising a common objective.
This completes the setting up of the basic model. The next section takes up the
task of analyzing outcomes when the set of public goods, P , is itself a choice variable.
3 The Public-Private MixWith andWithout Eﬃcient Supply
If this society had a costless choice, it would always opt for increasing β. It does
not matter through what combinations of public goods β is increased - all sets P for
which β is the same are identical from the point of view of social welfare. Given this,
we focus on β as the key choice variable, and characterize the cost of public goods
technology as the cost of increasing β. Moreover, for analytical ease we work with the
approximation that there are a large number of goods and treat β as a continuous
variable.
Let us suppose that society could “purchase” β at a unit cost (in terms of endow-
ment) of 2θ . In other words, the per capita marginal cost of converting a private
goods technology into a public goods technology is θ . Then utility in N and in E is
given by
V N = K + log (y − θβ) + log 2
(2− β) (18)
V E = K + log (y − θβ) + β log 2 (19)
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As in the previous section V N = V E if β equals zero or one and V N < V E for
intermediate values. There is thus an obvious sense in which, as a function of β,
V N is “more convex” than V E. As a consequence, the optimal choice of β is more
sensitive to θ in state N than in E.
Formally, the optimal choices of β in the two cases, bβNand bβE, and the achieved
utility levels bV Nand bV E as functions of θ and y are given by:
bβN = 1; bV N = K + log (y − θ) + log 2 if θ
y
≤ 1
2bβN ∈ (0, 1) ; V N = K + log y if θ
y
= 1
2bβN = 0; bV N = K + log y if θ
y
≥ 1
2
.



(20)
and
bβE = 1; bV E = K + log(y − θ) + log 2 if θ
y
≤ log 2
1+log 2bβE = yθ − 1log 2 ; bV E = K + log θ + yθ log 2− log log 2− 1 if log 21+log 2 ≤ θy ≤ log 2bβE = 0; V E = K + log y if θ
y
≥ log 2.



(21)
The optimal choices of “the degree of publicness” forN andE are shown in Figure 2 as
a function of θ
y
, the unit cost of β as a fraction of the endowment. For suﬃciently low
costs, (θ
y
< log 2
1+log 2
), all goods are chosen as public in both N and E. For suﬃciently
high costs ( θ
y
> log 2), all goods are private in N and E. For intermediate values
of cost, interesting diﬀerences appear. As θ
y
falls below log 2, E is the first to start
acquiring public goods, but for θ
y
above 0.5 N stays completely private. At θ
y
= 0.5 N
switches to completely public and stays that way. As θ
y
continues to fall, E becomes
increasingly public until bβE = 1 at θ
y
= log 2
1+log 2
.
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4 The Jointly Optimal Choice of Eﬃciency (or Not) and the
Degree of Publicness
If obtaining the eﬃcient equilibrium were costless, then society would always be in
E, with the choice of β depending on θ
y
, as shown in Figure 2. However, eﬃciency
itself is not free. It requires the setting up and operation of costly institutions. In
what follows we relate these costs to the choice of E versus N , taking into account
the optimal choice of β in each case.
We adopt the simple assumption that there is a fixed per capita cost π of achieving
eﬃciency. bβN and bV N are still given by (20) but in E the maximand is now
V E = K + log (y − π − θβ) + β log 2 (22)
so that in the expressions for bβE and bV E in (21), y is now replaced by y − π, i.e.
bβE = 1; bV E = K + log(y − π − θ) + log 2 if θ
y−π ≤
log 2
1+log 2bβE = y−πθ − 1log 2 ; bV E = K + log θ + y−πθ log 2− log log 2− 1 if log 21+log 2 ≤ θy−π ≤ log 2bβE = 0; V E = K + log(y − π) if θ
y−π ≥ log 2.



(23)
Thus, conditional on society choosing E rather than N , higher values of π result
in lower values of bβE. In state E, an increase in π is equivalent to a reduction
in y, and given the diminishing marginal utility of income embodied in the term
log (y − π − θβ) the appropriate response is to oﬀset the loss of income by a reduction
in θβ i.e. to economise on resources by choosing a lower level of publicness.
It is now straightforward to analyse the choice of E versus N . For any given values
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of π, θ, and y, the higher of bV E and bV N indicates whether or not it is worth putting
in place those institutions which enable society to overcome free-rider problems and
achieve eﬃciency. An equiproportional increase in π, θ, and y has no eﬀect on bβE or
bβN , or on the diﬀerence bV E − bV N , and Figure 3 shows the optimal regime, E or N ,
as a function of π
y
and θ
y
To interpret Figure 3, recall a result of Section 3, shown in Figure 2, that in regime
E (and with π/y implicitly equal to zero) it is optimal to choose an intermediate
degree of publicness if log 2
1+log 2
< θ
y
< log 2, whereas in regime N βN switches from one
to zero at θ
y
= 0.5. But since V E ≥ V N , with equality if and only if β equals zero
or one, it follows that V E > V N if log 2
1+log 2
< θ
y
< log 2. For positive values of π
y
, the
range of θ
y
for which it is optimal to choose E over N becomes narrower. If π
y
is high
enough (greater than 1
2
− 1+log log 2
2 log 2
= 0.043) then the costs of eﬃciency are too great,
whatever the cost of using the Samuelson machine to convert private to public goods.
Figure 3 thus divides (π
y
, θ
y
) space into three regions: (i) an area where it is optimal
to choose N and set βN = 1. Here either the costs of eﬃciency are too great or the
costs of publicness are so low that a Nash regime can avoid any loss of welfare from
free-riding by making all goods public; (ii) an area where it is optimal to choose N
and set βN = 0. In this region either the costs of publicness are so high that both
regimes would set β = 0 (so that for π > 0 choosing E would only incur additional
costs), or for θ
y
just above 0.5 the gain from choosing positive levels of publicness
under E would not oﬀset the additional cost of eﬃciency; (iii) an area where it is
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optimal to choose E. Here the level of βE is given by
bβE = 1− πyθ
y
− 1
log 2
. (24)
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We started with the observation that societies seem to have a bewildering variety of
public-private mixes. Yet the basic framework in public economics is one where the
division of the space of goods into public and private is given exogenously as a tech-
nological datum. Thus in this framework it is simply the technologically determined
set of public goods that varies across societies and determines variations in the public
private mix. This is unsatisfactory theoretically, and implausible as a depiction of
reality, since we know that societies can and do choose to make the consumption char-
acteristics of a good as “public” or as “private” as they wish to. Many such example
were given in the introduction.
The central question in the literature on ineﬃcient supply of the public good does
not of course disappear in the broader framework of choice of the set of public goods.
Rather, the two aspects interact in interesting and intriguing ways. The choice of
the set of public goods is not independent of whether or not the collective action
problems will be solved for these goods; and whether or not it is worth paying the
cost of solving collective action problems is itself not independent of the set of public
goods. Figure 3 characterizes the jointly optimal choice of the degree of publicness
and the degree of eﬃciency in the supply of public goods, as a function of the two
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basic cost parameters–the cost of converting private goods into public goods (or
the price of “Samuelson machines”), and the cost of enforcing the eﬃcient collective
action outcome on the supply of public goods.
Figure 3 allows us an entry point into understanding the diﬀerent choices that
societies might make, and why. Fairly clearly, when the cost of turning private goods
into public is high enough, the society will go for a very low degree of publicness. In
contrast, when this cost is low enough, it will go for a very high degree of publicness.
Frontier societies with physical barriers to creating a common platform for positive
externalities will opt for low publicness in their public-private mix. More generally,
a specific hypothesis that flows from this analysis is that population density is a
determinant of the degree of publicness.
Notice, however, that for both high enough and low enough costs of publicness,
it is not worthwhile to pay the costs of solving collective action problems. This is
because the margin at which free riding induces ineﬃciency is non-existent when all
goods are public or all goods are private, and when the degree of publicness is small
enough or large enough, the costs of free riding are correspondingly small relative
to the costs of enforcing collective action. Paradoxically, therefore, observing free
riding in the supply of public goods does not necessarily indicate social ineﬃciency,
once the costs of the “eﬃcient” outcome are taken into account. However, a specific
hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that we will observe a Nash equilibrium
in the supply of public goods in societies with both very high and very low degrees
of publicness.
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For intermediate values of the cost of publicness, and for low enough costs of
eﬃciency, we predict that society will choose eﬃcient supply of the public goods it
chooses to produce, this degree of publicness being given by (24). In this range the
degree of publicness will decline with the cost of eﬃciency and the cost of publicness.
This scenario perhaps comes closest to economists’ basic intuitions on explaining the
variation in the degree of publicness. As the cost of free riding increases, the value of
public goods declines, and it is not worth paying the price of the marginal Samuelson
machine–the degree of publicness falls.
Finally, consider what happens as societies become richer. Of course, if the cost of
eﬃciency and the cost of publicness rise in proportion, nothing is changed in Figure 3.
But suppose now, at one extreme, that these costs remain constant. Then essentially
the outcome moves inwards along a ray to the origin in Figure 3. The most variegated
pattern occurs when the ray crosses the Eﬃcient region depicted in Figure 3. Then,
for low levels of income, the outcome is one of zero degree of publicness. As income
increases we move into a region of increasing publicness and eﬃcient supply of the
public goods. But finally, at high level of incomes, the degree of publicness becomes
extreme and we observe free riding in the supply of the public good. Thus the
prediction is that as income increases the degree of publicness rises, but that the
likelihood of Nash equilibrium has an inverse-U shape–it is highest in both very rich
and very poor societies.
We hope that the line of enquiry begun here will prove fruitful in opening up the
black box of an assumed given set of public goods. A direct consideration of how
18
and why societies choose to convert some private goods into public ones, and vice
versa, generates both interesting theory, and interesting predictions and hypotheses
for empirical work.
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